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CHAPTER I 
 
1.1  Introduction and Problem Statement 
 
In the past century the world witnessed a dramatic increase in the population of the 
human race to the detriment of the world’s environment and other biological forms of 
life.  The seriousness of the situation is realized by more and more of the world’s human 
population.  The population increase was made possible by the advances made in the 
biologic sciences and supported by technological advances in all disciplines e.g. health,  
agriculture, communication etc.  The advances were made affordable due to their 
financial and economic foundation.  For many reasons e.g. political, social and financial 
pressure, foreign direct investment by developed countries, became acceptable for both 
the developed countries on the one side and the developing and third world counties on 
the other side of the balance.  There was an increased demand for commodities which in 
general stimulated the growth of various sectors of the economy.  Beneficiation and 
cheap production processes were some of the factors driving the demand for energy. Vast 
amounts of carbon dioxide and other Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) were produced by 
oil/fuel burning processes e.g. in industry vehicles, aeroplanes and coal power stations 
etc. Although industrialized nations are the main source of GHGs, the contribution of 
GHGs from developing and third world nations are growing at an alarming rate.  
Research scientists claim to have proof that GHGs cause a rise in  atmospheric 
temperature which will have a dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.  Most nations in the world perceive this finding to be fact. Dramatic changes in 
the atmospheric patterns and an increase in natural disasters with short and long term 
effects have been forecasted. There is a worldwide realization by all nations that 
everybody may be affected if this hypothesis proves to be correct.  
Over the last decades, it was also realized that all human disciplines should be involved 
to stabilize the atmospheric temperature by controlling GHGs concentrations. When the 
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World Trade Organization (WTO) came into existence, it did not take into account the 
causes and consequences of a global climate change.  To address the problem of GHG 
production, reduction of emissions had to be made more financially affordable.  Financial 
instruments had to be created which had to be acceptable for trading purposes.  The 
Kyoto Protocol provided for these financial instruments through the so called “flexible 
mechanisms”.  Through the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, Assigned 
Amount Units, Emission Reduction Units and Certified Emission Reduction credits are 
generated which can be traded with internationally.     
Many parties that ratified the Kyoto Protocol are also members of the World Trade 
Organization.  This prompted speculation over possible conflicts between the Kyoto 
Protocol provisions and the WTO body of rules.  As of yet there are no direct agreements 
or precedents of the WTO that define how the tradable units and credits of the Kyoto 
Protocol will be viewed.  The WTO does not provide a framework for the classification 
of “Kyoto units”. 
1.2  Significance and Scope of the study 
 
The scope of the study is based on the views of different world authorities on this matter.  
The current legal status regarding the different opinions and arguments are also 
considered.  This study will be limited to defining what allocation of allowances, unit and 
credits are and if these units and credits itself, as created by the Kyoto Protocol can be 
defined as goods, products, services or subsidies under the WTO body of rules.  
Domestic policies and measures such as “border tax adjustments” will fall outside the 
scope of this paper.    
 
It is inevitably that conflict between these two regimes (the Kyoto Protocol and WTO) 
will arise and is therefore of importance to understand what the provisions of the Kyoto 
Protocol create.  It will also assist policy makers and their advisors to understand the 
environmental threat and debate, and to make decisions accordingly in the absence of a 
WTO framework in this area. 
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1.3  Objectives of the study 
 
A literature search and evaluation: 
1.  To analyze the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol and applicable WTO Agreements. 
2.  To assess possible interaction and conflict between these two regimes. 
3. To analyze the classification of allocation of allowances, units and credits generated by 
the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol under the applicable WTO Agreements. 
4.  To give recommendations to avoid conflict and how to incorporate environmental 
concerns. 
 
1.4  Methodology 
 
This study will be literature based focusing on the analysis of the relevant available 
literature.  The research shall rely on both primary and secondary sources of literature. 
Among the primary sources are the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services and the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures of the WTO, Conference of the Parties Decisions and Panel 
Decisions of the WTO.   Secondary sources will includes books, academic and scholarly 
articles, and various Internet sites consulted for background, relevant and up to date 
information on the subject matter. 
 
1.5  Chapter Overview 
 
This paper is divided into four chapters. Chapter one gives and introduction, general 
statement of the problem while referring to the significance and scope of the study. This 
chapter will also identify the objectives for conducting the research and methodology 
applied. 
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Chapter two will stipulate the current context within which the Kyoto Protocol is placed 
and will indicate how and why the WTO will be the choice of forum for disputes arising 
between parties to the Kyoto Protocol and members of the WTO. 
  
Chapter three will analyze certain provisions of the Kyoto Protocol.  Focus will be on 
explaining what allowances, units and credits are and how the Kyoto Protocol provides 
for international trading in these emission rights. 
 
Chapter four will analyse and compare the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol and the 
WTO and speculate whether the allocation of allowances, units or credits will be defined 
as goods, products, services or subsidies.  The conclusion and recommendations then 
follow.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Sustained economic growth and the maintenance of environmental viability are the two 
issues upon which it is imperative to agree.  The world economy and the economies of 
most individual nations are interdependent on international trade. Currently most 
industrial economic activities create and emit a vast amount of anthropogenic gasses 
that substantially worsen what has been termed the greenhouse effect. This is an all-
pervasive feature of our modern industrialised society.  Subsequently, the planet's 
climate is slowly warming up, with potentially far reaching and devastating 
consequences.   Global Climate Policy is a comprehensive and complex subject 
involving a number of academic disciplines.  
For several decades scientists had warned that the emission of anthropogenic gases 
(greenhouse gases) should be reduced, but only in the 1980s did international pressure 
come to a head.  In 1992 the United Nations addressed the issue for the first time during 
its Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).1  This was followed in 1997 
by the Kyoto Protocol, a plan to use “market mechanisms” to address the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) by industrialised countries with a focus on sustainable 
development. 2   
The consequences of reducing human-induced emission of GHGs, implies a change in 
the way parties to the Kyoto Protocol engage in activities cutting through a significant 
spectrum of society.  The impact of limiting greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) will 
modify key economic structures such as transport, agriculture, health, manufacturing, 
investment and, not least, the production of energy, all whose areas of interests cross 
international boundaries.  Because it requires countries to modify and to streamline key 
infrastructures, investment systems, and the adaption of legal systems, the Kyoto 
                                                 
1United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change May 9, 1992, 1771 31 I.L.M. 849. Available at 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/2853.php. 
2Kyoto Protocol to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 33 I.L.M 
32. Available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. Last visited 
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Protocol will have an impact on economies and international trade relations unlike any 
other existing Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs). 
The Kyoto Protocol is unique because it represents the first global attempt by developed 
nations to collectively reduce the emission of a broad range of greenhouse gases but also 
represents the first MEA that has created a global market for trading in emissions.  
“Never before has a MEA had the potential to impact so many sectors of the economy, so 
many economic interests and such high volumes of trade in products and services”.3  This 
presents countries with difficult policy-related dilemmas regarding the integration of  
trade and environmental objectives.  This will be the real challenge to policy makers. 
2.1  WTO as Choice of Forum 
The international discussions following the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol falls within 
the broader debate about the intersections and conflicts between international trade and 
environmental regimes.  These discussions drew attention to the relationship between the 
emission trading system of the Kyoto Protocol and the legally binding rules embodied by 
the World Trade Organization (WTO)4 governing international trade. 
Article 2(v) of the Kyoto Protocol promotes the "progressive reduction or phasing out of 
market imperfections, fiscal incentives, tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in all 
greenhouse gas emitting sectors that run contrary to the objective of the Convention and 
application of market instruments",5 and Article 2(3) of the Kyoto Protocol provides that 
parties “shall strive to implement policies and measures……in such a way as to 
minimize adverse effects, including adverse effects of climate change, effects on 
international trade…..”.6  The UNFCCC reflects similar language in several places.    
This is in line with the WTO’s objective of  “…substantial reduction of tariffs and other 
barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade 
                                                 
3 Werksman, Jacob, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and the WTO, 8 Rev, European Community and 
International Law, 1999, p 251,252. 
4 Marakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, The Legal Text:  The 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 2 (1999), 186 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 
1144 (1994). 
5 Supra note 2. 
6 Ibid. 
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relations”. 7  The Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement  “in return” states that parties in 
“their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a 
view of raising standards of living….while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s 
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable developments, seeking both to 
protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means of doing so in a manner 
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic 
development”.8     
However, there are main ideological differences between the Kyoto Protocol and the 
WTO.   The Kyoto Protocol’s main objective is to reduce (by implication restrictive 
laws unless greenhouse gas-producing factories change) GHGs through the facilitation 
of efficiently functioning international emission markets and facilitate sustainable 
development.  The WTO’s main objectives are that of raising living standards, ensuring 
full employment, increase in real income and effective demand, sustainable 
development, growth in international trade and trade liberalization. 
Another area of intersection between the two instruments concerns dispute settlement. 
This issue has been highlighted in the discourse concerning the refusal by the United 
States (US) to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  The US claims that Kyoto exempts 80 percent 
of the world from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the US economy.  The 
United States stresses that Kyoto will not be able to effectively combat a global change 
in climate if developing countries like India and China are not subject to binding 
obligations relating to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. 9  As opposed to the 
US, the Kyoto Protocol has been approved by the European Community (EC), and has 
committed itself to meet its established emission reduction commitments. 10  
Disharmony has increased between the US and the EC.  The US administration fears 
that the EC will employ WTO dispute settlement mechanisms to promote the Kyoto 
                                                 
7Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement, Supra note 4. 
8Supra note 1. 
9 Carlane C. “The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Reconciling Tensions Between Free Trade and 
Environmental Objectives. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law”, Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy, 17, Winter 2006, 45.  
10   Status of Ratification UNFCCC Status of Ratification. Available at  
http://uunfccc.int/resource/conv/ratlist.pdf 
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Protocol and to punish the United States for its refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.11  
The dialogue between the US and the EC illustrates the probability that conflicts 
between the WTO and the Kyoto Protocol will arise in the future.  
Many scholars question the WTO’s ability to effectively address environmental issues.  
The argument being that the WTO is a trade liberalization institution, lacks expertise on 
environmental issues, is bias toward corporate interests and will apply trade principles 
to settle environmental disputes. 
Regardless of whether the WTO is an appropriate forum, dialogue between the US and 
EC coupled with the fact that the preferred choice of forum for trade-environmental 
issues have often been the WTO, conflicts will most probably be referred to the WTO 
for settlement by the Dispute Settlement Body.  Further, the WTO dispute settlement 
system is deemed to be attractive because of its compulsory and binding nature, right of 
appeal, strict implementation, enforcement procedures and “short timetables”.  It is also 
viewed as the one institution with the most “teeth”.12   
There are questions about whether and how the rights and obligations of the members of 
the WTO and the parties to the Kyoto Protocol may conflict. Of particular concern is 
whether provisions in the Kyoto Protocol, as well as government policies and business 
activities undertaken in keeping with those provisions, may conflict with the WTO non-
discrimination principles of National Treatment and Most Favoured Nation treatment. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 See e.g., Christopher C. Horner, “WTO to Face U.S.-E.U. Kyoto Dispute.  Washington Times, Sept. 21, 
2002.  Available at http://www.sepp.org/Archive/NewSEPP/WTO2FaceDisput-Horner.htm.  
12Supra note 5, page 49. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
3.1  Defining Global Warming in relation to the Greenhouse Effect 
Infra-red radiation represents the heat waves created from different sources e.g. the earth, 
the sun, but also very important, industrial and other human activities in an increasing 
trend as part of worldwide pollution.  A balance is continually created by a change in the 
atmospheric temperature which is measured as degrees Celsius.  Naturally heat is 
retained in the atmosphere by different mechanisms to make life possible on earth. 
Excessive or inadequate heat retention according to scientists may destroy life on earth as 
we know it.  At present the atmospheric temperature is rising constantly. 
The only dramatic change of all the known factors is the increased energy production, 
caused by human activities. According to science a number of relative lightweight 
chemicals are produced by humans and therefore industrial activity which has the 
chemical ability to absorb infra-red (heat) irradiation in the atmosphere. Due to their light 
weight they tend to rise to the upper atmosphere, and not only absorb, but prevents the 
infra-red irradiation of heat into space. Some of the gasses  with heat retaining abilities 
have been identified and the 6 gasses referred to as GHGs are water vapour , carbon 
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFC’s) and perfluorocarbons (PFC’s). It should be remembered  
that other gasses with the same abilities exist, and may be added to the list.  It has been 
calculated that a doubling in the concentration of GHG’s, will reduce the rate at which 
planet Earth can shed energy into space by 2%.  That is an equivalent of  energy of 3 
million tons of oil every minute.  Scientists argue that human activity is the main factor 
changing the balance which has a negative impact on the planet.  Something has to be 
done about it.  “If emissions continue to grow at the current rates, it is almost certain that 
atmospheric levels of carbon monoxide will double from pre-industrial levels during the 
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21 st  century.  If no steps are taken to slow greenhouse gas emissions,it is quite possible 
that levels will triple by the year 2100”.13  
3.2  The Kyoto Timeline: 
 
21 March 1992     :  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change                                           
                                    into force. 
April 1995            :   The 1ST Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 1) 
held in Geneva, Switzerland.14 
December 1997   :   COP 3, held in Kyoto, Japan (The Kyoto Protocol’s place of   
birth) 
November 1998   :   COP 4, held in Buenos Aires, Argentina (Buenos Aires Plan of 
Action). 
October 1999       :      COP 5, held in Bonn, Germany. 
November 2000   :   COP 6, held in The Hague, Netherlands. 
                               Which resumed in July 2001 in Bonn, Germany 
March 2001          :      The United States withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol 
October 2001       :      COP 7, held in Marrakesh, Morocco.  “COP 7 provided the 
international community with the rulebook needed to implement JI 
and CDM projects, also referred to as “Marrakesh Accords”.  
October 2002       :  COP 8, held in New Delhi, India (Delhi Declarations) 
December 2003    :   COP 9, held in Milan, Italy 
22 October 2004  : Russia Ratifies the Kyoto Protocol.   
December 2004    :  COP 10, Buenos Aires, Argentina 
16 February 2005 :   Kyoto Protocol enters into Force 2005 
November 2006   :   COP 12, Nairobi, Kenya 
 
 
                                                 
13 Beginners Guide to the Convention:  “Understanding Climate Change:  A Beginner’s Guide to the UN 
Framework Convention.  Available at  http://unfccc.int\resource\beginner.html 
14Countries that are parties to the UNFCCC but not parties to the Kyoto Protocol can participate in the COP 
as observers but cannot make decisions. See http://www.usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-
english&y=2006&m=November&x=200611061455481lcnirellep0.3268701     
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3.3  Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol 
 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was the 
forerunner to the Kyoto Protocol and was concluded in New York on 9 May 1992, it 
came into force on 21 March 1994.15  The first limitation of the UNFCCC was that the 
goals did not bind parties, and the second, the objective of the UNFCCC was to stabilise 
rather than reduce greenhouse gas emissions, “at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system”.16   It was for this reason that the 
Kyoto Protocol was negotiated and adopted at the third meeting of the Conference of 
Parties to the UNFCCC  in Kyoto, Japan, which established legally binding emission 
targets for the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHGs).17   
 
The COP will also serve as the MOP (Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol).  The 
Conference of the Parties (COP) is the “supreme body” of the UNFCCC Convention and 
decides on issues relating to the Kyoto Protocol.  It is the highest decision making 
authority.  It is an association of all the countries that are Parties to the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol and meets on a annual basis, unless the parties decide otherwise.18  
 
For the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force, 55 members representing 55 per cent of the 
total GHG emissions in 1990, had to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  Without Russia, Annex 1 
ratifications would only represent 44 per cent of the total GHG emissions produced.19 
The Kyoto Protocol entered into force only after it was ratified by Russia. With Russia, 
parties to the Kyoto Protocol now calculate for 64 percent.20   
 
Annex I parties to the Kyoto Protocol have committed themselves to achieving, between 
2008-2012, a 5.2 per cent reduction in GHG emissions from the levels existing in 1990, 
                                                 
15 Available at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/2853.php 
16 Supra note 1, article 2. 
17 Supra note 2. 
18Grubb M., Vrolijk C. and Brack, D., “The Kyoto Protocol:  A Guide and Assessment”, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1999, Glossary, page xxvii.  See also http//unfccc.int/meetings/items/2654.php.  
19 See http://www.cseindia.org/programme/geg/cdm_timeline.htm 
20 Status of ratification available at htpp://maindb.unfccc.int/public/country.pl?group=Kyoto 
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and is reflected in article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol.21   It is still too early to gauge how 
successful the Protocol will be in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the 
2008-2012 budget window.  Nevertheless, it is the one multilateral policy tool that we 
possess with which to address the problem of global warming. 
 
It will be costly for parties to limit GHGs to their respective commitment obligations and 
parties will face different degrees of costs in limiting GHG emissions.  From an 
economic perspective it matters when and where reductions occur.  Many economic 
analysis have been conducted and the overall conclusion reached was that the costs for 
achieving reduction of GHGs will be at its lowest through international emission trading 
instead of countries trying to reach their commitments on their own domestically.  The 
flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol provide parties with a degree of flexibility 
in choosing the time and place for reducing emissions.  The flexible mechanisms of the 
Kyoto Protocol are International Emissions Trading (IET), Joint Implementation (JI) and 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).22   
 
3.4 Emissions Trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol 
 
The concept of emissions trading is not completely new, but this relatively new concept 
is introduced by Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol.  It forms the basis for a global 
emissions trading system among Annex I parties with commitments inscribed in Annex B 
to the Kyoto Protocol.  The basic feature of Emissions Trading as foreseen by the Kyoto 
Protocol, is an exchange of emission rights. 
 
  Article 17:  “The Conference of the Parties shall define the relevant principles, modalities, rules 
and guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting and accountability for 
emissions trading.  The Parties included in Annex B may participate in emissions 
                                                 
21 “Annex I countries or parties” refers to developed countries with legally binding emissions limitation 
obligations as set out in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.  Annex I countries are also sometimes refer to as 
“Annex B countries or parties”.  “non Annex I countries or non Annex B countries” refers to developing 
countries without binding emissions limitation obligations but are parties to the Kyoto Protocol. 
22 The Marrakesh Accords provide the rule book  for the flexibility mechanisms.  Decision 15/CP.7 lays 
down the priciples, nature and scope, decision 16/CP.7, 17/CP.7 and 18/CP.7 cointains the operational 
provisions for JI, CDM and IET respectively.  Decision 19/CP.7 provides for the rules for a system registry.  
Available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a02.pdf  
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trading for the purposes of fulfilling their commitments under Article 3.  Any such 
trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under that Article”.23 
 
Although Article 17 itself is mostly referred to in the context of trading of AAU’s, the 
restriction to AAU’s can not be found in the text of Article 17 itself.  The Annex to 
Decision 18 of the COP 7, states that “a Party included in Annex I with a commitment 
inscribed in Annex B is eligible to transfer and/or acquire ERUs, CERs, AAUs.”24  Thus 
Article 17 include trade in ERUs and CERs.  The Kyoto Protocol also does not explicitly 
state if private or legal entities can participate in emissions trading but participation of 
companies and other private entities is clearly desired.25    Participation by entities in 
emissions trading allows for two possibilities to emerge.  Some parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol will establish a domestic emissions trading scheme that will in turn integrate 
with other emission trading schemes of parties.  However, some parties may choose to 
trade directly with entities of other party states without an established domestic emissions 
trading scheme.26 
 
The two principle types of trading flowing from the Kyoto Protocol are:  
 
1.  Trading between parties who committed themselves to legally binding limits.  
The Kyoto Protocol provides for three ways through its flexible mechanism through 
which parties with legally binding emission limits on GHG emissions may participate in 
emissions trading: 27  
a)  Trading in Assigned Amounts;  
b)  Agreements entered into to meet their emission caps jointly in the form of Collective 
Targets; and 
                                                 
23Supra note 2. 
24Decision 18/CP.7, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2, para 1. Report of the Conference of Parties on its Seventh 
Session, Held at Marrakesh from 29 October to 10 November 2001. Available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01.pdf  
25Buck M. and Verheyen R, “International Trade Law and Climate Change – A Positive Way Forward”, 
July 2001.  Available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/stabsabteilung/01052.pdf  
26The EU emissions trading scheme is considered to be the first “CO2 Trading Scheme” in the world and 
January 2005 marked the start of the EU emissions trading scheme.  See 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emissions/citl_en.htm  
27 Annex I countries are also referred to as Annex B countries. 
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c)  Project Based Trading of Assigned Amounts 
 
2.  Trading between countries with limits and countries without limits.   
Here the Kyoto Protocol provides for trading through the so called Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), which is the third flexible mechanism incorporated into the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
 
The three mechanisms share a common basis in the basic articles on commitments and 
read as follows: 
 
  3(10)     “Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party    
acquires   from another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or of 
Article 17 shall be added to the assigned amount for the acquiring Party”.28 
 
  3(11)     “Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party 
transfers from another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or Article 17 
shall be subtracted from the assigned amount for the acquiring Party”.29 
 
3(12)    “Any certified emission reductions which a Party acquires from another Party in   
accordance with the provisions of Article 12 shall be added to the assigned amount for 
the acquiring Party”.30 
 
3.5.  Trading between parties which have committed themselves to legally 
binding limits 
 
a)  Trading in Assigned Amounts. 
 
The six greenhouses gases which fall within the scope of the protocol are:  carbon 
dioxide (C02), methane CH4, nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).31  Each gas has a certain index 
due to the varying power to accelerate global warming.  On the basis of this index each 
gas is translated into CO2 equivalents, which are the base unit under the Kyoto Protocol.  
                                                 
28Supra note 2. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 The Greenhouse Gases, Sectors and Sources are listed in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol.  
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Each country is allowed to emit a certain amount of these base units called the Assigned 
Amount (AA).32  Thus, AAs are the total amount of emissions that an Annex 1 party may 
emit over the commitment period and still meet its emission target, referred to as 
quantified emissions limitations and reduction commitments (QELRC),33 as set out in 
Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.  These allowances when traded are referred to as 
Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) each of which is equal to one metric tonne of CO2 
equivalent.34  All units and credits referred to in the Kyoto Protocol are equal to one 
metric tonne of CO2.   
 
The emissions of Annex I parties may not exceed the AA, unless parties have acquired 
additional emission rights through the use of the flexible mechanisms.  According to 
Articles 17, 3(10) and 3(11), parties through their governments can trade with these 
AAUs, but require a transferring Party to deduct the transfer from its AA before the 
acquiring party can add the transfer and increase its assigned amount.35  Remaining 
AAU’s can be sold to other parties to the Kyoto Protocol or be held for future fulfilment 
commitment periods.   
 
b) Collective Targets. 
 
Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol permits Annex I parties to enter into agreements with 
other Annex B parties to meet their emissions target commitments jointly.36  For 
example, the EU as a whole has decided to collectively reduce their emissions by 8% and 
will meet its target as a group. Emission commitments (AA) will be redistributed between 
countries while the collective total will be preserved.  These arrangements may not be 
changed for the duration of the commitment period, thus the EU can not meet its 
commitment through the expansion to include other countries.  Should countries not be in 
                                                 
32 Freestone D. (ed.) and Streck C. (ed.), “Legal aspects of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms:  
Making Kyoto Work”, Oxford University Press, 2005, page 407. 
33 Ibid, page 10. 
34 Decision 11of FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/Add.2, Report of the Conference of Parties on its Seventh Session, 
Held at Marrakesh from 29 October to 10 November 2001. Available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01.pdf  
35 Article 17 is discussed on page 
36 Supra note 2. 
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compliance with their obligations, each is held individually responsible.  In the case of 
the EU, the European Community is the legal entity representing the EU as a party to the 
Kyoto Protocol and countries will be joint and severally liable.37  
 
c)  Project Based Trading of Assigned Amounts (Joint Implementation). 
 
The economic concept was introduced by Norway and interestingly, it was the Bush 
administration of the US that drove the incorporation of the JI mechanism ultimately into 
the text of the Kyoto Protocol, and in the final negotiations. 
 
Nowhere in the Kyoto Protocol is the term Joint Implementation explicitly referred to 
itself.  Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, however laid down the basis of what is known as 
JI and is also known as the origin of CDM.  Further, JI can only be implemented between 
Parties with QELRCs, and thus the integrity of the JI depends on the host countries 
ability to accurately establish and account for its AAU’s.   
 
Joint Implementation is based on the reduction or removal of GHG emissions through 
project based activities between Annex 1 parties, which generate credits named Emission 
Reduction Units (ERUs).  These ERUs can be used by Annex I parties to meet part of a 
party’s obligation under Article 3.38   
 
An important requirement to a JI project, is that the emissions reductions that result from 
this project, should be additional to reductions that would have occurred in the absence of 
that investments.  Joint Implementation does not allow additions to the overall amount of 
AAU’s allocated under a country’s “emissions budget”.  Hence, ERUs can only be used 
to partly fulfill the legally binding obligations under Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol.39    
 
                                                 
37 Grubb M., Vrolijk C and Brack D., “The Kyoto Protocol:  A Guide and Assessmen”, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1999, page 122 - 123 
38 Supra note 2. 
39 Supra note 2, Article 6 (1)(d). 
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In contrast with AAUs, emission credits can be generated privately.  It leaves Annex 1 
parties with the discretion to authorize legal entities to trade40 or participate in emissions 
trading through JI under government’s authority.    
 
Articles 3(10) and 3(11) specify that ERUs acquired will be added to a party’s assigned 
amount, thus emission limits will be credited, and any ERU transferred to another party 
will be subtracted from the transferring parties, assigned amount.  In other words, the 
credits referred to under Article 6 are actually assigned amount units renamed as ERUs, 
rather than a new unit.  Participation in JI project activities implies the transfer of AAUs 
which have been converted to ERUs. 
 
3.6  Trading Between Parties with legally binding emissions limits and those 
without 
 
The rationale of the CDM is that projects that reduce emissions in non Annexure B 
parties will benefit the planet no matter where is takes place.  This is especially 
applicable to fast developing countries like India and China. 
 
Where Article 6 refers to Annex I countries transferring ERUs with other Annex I 
countries, Article 12, via its CDM allows Annex I countries to receive credits generated 
by investments in CDM projects that are based in developing countries without legally 
binding emission commitments (non-Annex B or non-Annex I countries).  These credits 
are called Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs).   
 
The CDM allows countries to fund specific eligible emission reduction projects that 
contribute to sustainable development in developing countries and then according to 
article 3(12), to credit the resulting emissions reductions credits against their obligations. 
Article 12 allows for the participation of public or private entities.41  Both in CDM and JI 
projects the use of services such as engineers, architects, financial services etc. will be 
                                                 
40 Ibid. See article 6(3). Trade refers to the generation, transfer or acquisition of credits. 
41 Ibid, Article 12(9). 
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implied, from the host country and/or countries investing in projects in non Annex I 
countries.  Clean Development Mechanism projects must be approved by both 
governments and the credits generated must be validated and verified as CERs.42   
 
Each CER transferred under the CDM will entitle an Annex I party to an equivalent 
increase in emissions within its territory, while remaining in compliance. The CDM 
differs from JI in that there is no limit on the amount of CERs that can be generated.  
CERs can be used to increase Annex I countries emissions above its “emissions budget” 
provided that these reduction in emissions are additional to any that would have occurred 
in the absence of the certified project activity.43  Thus for both CDM and JI an Annex I 
party must provide information showing that the use of the flexible mechanisms is 
supplemental to domestic action which constitutes a “significant element” of the efforts 
by Annex I countries.44  Should an Annex 1 country be in compliance with its 
obligations, these credits can be sold or kept for future projects or commitment periods.   
 
In conclusion, the following applies for all transboundary exchange of emissions permits 
(AAUs, ERUs and CERs) by governments and those initiated by approved entities 
authorized to participate in emissions trading under the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol.  
Currently the rules provide that each Annex I country must have a national registry in the 
form of an electronic database.  Here the actual tradable units and credits held at any 
given time will be reflected.  Each approved legal entity in the case of JI and each 
approved public or private entity according to CDM, must have an account reflecting the 
permits it holds.  The accounts of each approved entity will be electronically linked to 
their country’s registry.  The actual transfer closes or the “deal closes” when an entity 
records it in its own account.  This recording will then immediately reflect in a party’s 
registry.  Only parties to the Kyoto Protocol will have national registries and only 
approved entities will have accounts.45    
 
                                                 
42 Supra note 31, page 191 – 199. 
43 Ibid, Article 12(5)(c). 
44 See http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php 
45COP 7, UNFCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2, Annex.  Available at http://unfccc.int/resouce/docs/cop7/13a02.pdf 
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In conclusion, all transfers will be made through the national registries of the authorizing 
Annex I party.  A transfer of Kyoto Units by a legal entity in Country A to a legal entity 
in Country B is, at the same time, a transfer of such Kyoto Units by County A to Country 
B.  The total amount of Kyoto Units in the national account of Country A will be 
decreased by the number of Kyoto Units transferred by the legal entity.  Thus, any 
transfer of units of credits between legal entities has to be mirrored by adding and 
subtracting an equivalent amount of AAUs in the national emissions registry of parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol in which private or legal entities engage.46   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
4.1  Speculating the coverage by WTO Agreements 
Much research and negotiations have been devoted to the design and functioning of the 
Kyoto Protocols flexible mechanisms and hence questions arose about possible conflicts 
with international trade law.  The questions addressed in the following section is whether 
emissions traders exchange goods, products or services and if emission allowance and the 
allocation thereof can be defined as subsidies by WTO definition.  WTO Agreements 
relevant to this discussion are, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),47 
the General Agreement in Trade in Services (GATS),48 and the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures to the GATT, (SCM and herein after called Subsidies 
Agreement).49  
For the purpose of the analysis in this paper, the reader should note that, unless 
otherwise stated, the countries referred to are members of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  Non-members would not be able to register a complaint against another 
country under the WTO system of trade rules if not a member.  
WTO panels have consistently been hostile towards unilateral trade measures taken to 
protect the global commons, but have not yet had the occasion to rule on conflicts 
between the WTO and Kyoto.50  Similarly, there are no current WTO Agreements that 
                                                 
47 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal Text:  The Results of th Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations 4 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S.154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). 
48 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr 15, 1994, , Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1B, The Legal Text:  The Results of th Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations 284 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S.183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994). 
49 General Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, The Legal Text:  The Results of th Uruguay Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 275 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 14. 
50 Global commons are natural assets outside national jurisdiction such as oceans, air or the atmosphere, 
outer space etc.  Global commons are not owned by a specific country but are the property of all countries.  
In terms of the Kyoto Protocol, for the holders of allowances, it does not create an entitlement in the 
atmosphere itself, as the state does not transfer ownership of a parcel of air.  The assignment of quantified 
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defines emissions allowances51 or international trade in emissions allowances coupled by 
the fact that the Kyoto Protocol represents the first opportunity for international 
emissions trading on such a large scale.  Therefore, there is as of yet no direct relevant 
precedents to classify these instruments and the resulting units and credits.  Only the 
WTO and bodies created by the WTO have the legal competence to interpret WTO 
Agreements.  WTO panels are allowed to make findings on facts, and the WTO 
Ministerial Conference and General Council have the authority to adopt interpretations of 
WTO Agreements.  This implies that this analysis is speculative in nature.   
 
4.2  Goods or Products or Services 
 
The fundamental principles as discussed below are the foundation of the multilateral 
trading system and runs throughout the whole body of agreements of the WTO.  They are 
as follows: 
 
(a)  Most Favoured Nation Principle (MFN) in Article I of the GATT:  Countries may not  
discriminate between their trading partners.  Any privilege granted to one member 
must be granted to other member states, thus members must be granted equal 
treatment.  A member cannot treat a “like goods or products” of one member more 
favourably than “like goods or products” of another member. 
 
(b)  National Treatment Principle (NT) of Article III of GATT:  Foreign goods imported 
into a   member state, should be treated in the same manner as domestically produced 
goods of a member state.  Thus, once goods have entered a market, they must be 
treated equivalent to the “like” domestically produced goods or products. 
  
(c)  Prohibition on import or export restrictions in Article XI of GATT:  Quantitative 
restrictions on imports or exports is a measure that has the effect of preventing or 
                                                                                                                                                 
emission reduction targets aims at regulating the use of the atmosphere, not the access to the atmosphere, it 
creates merely the right to release a certain amount of GHGs  in the atmosphere for parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol.  Supra note 32, p 3. 
51 Emission allowances refers to assigned amounts and the resulting AAUs and ERUs and CERs. 
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limiting imports or exports, such as a ban on an import of a particular product, quotas, 
import licenses etc. 
 
These relative standards (MFN and NT) of the WTO “requires” a comparison of 
treatment between the “like goods, products or services” of countries, and the test is 
whether a measure directly or indirectly discriminates between “like goods, products or 
services”.52  The absolute standards of the WTO, restricts member states the use of 
quantitative restrictions or limitations on the number or total value of imports or exports 
of goods or products, and the GATS on market access restrictions on the import or export 
of services.  The Subsidies Agreement prohibits the use of subsidies or other forms of 
benefits that promote the export of domestically produced goods.  Should one of these 
principles be a breach thereof it may be regarded as arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where “like” conditions prevail. 53  These 
considerations are of relevance due to the fact that some parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
who are also members of the WTO, seek to restrict the trade in emission allowances, 
either on the basis of country of origin or quantitatively.   
 
What is a “like good or product”?  In the Korea-Alcoholic Beverages case, the definition 
of like product is as follows:   
 
   ““Like” products are a subset of directly competitive or substitutable products:  all like products  
are, by definition, directly competitive or substitutable products, whereas not all “directly 
competitive or substitutable” products are “like”. While perfectly substitutable products fall 
within Article III:2, first sentence, imperfectly substitutable products can be assessed under 
Article III:2, second sentence”.54   
 
Whether a product is a “like product” will be established on a case by case basis.  
Applied, should units or credits be considered as “like goods or products or service”, the 
                                                 
52 Service suppliers are also included in the meaning of “service”. 
53 Werksman J., “Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and the WTO” in Chambers W. B. (ed.), “Inter-
linkages:  The Kyoto Protocol and the International Trade and Investment Regimes”, The United Nations 
University, 2001, p. 161. 
54Korea – Texas on Alcoholic Beverages, Feb.17, 1999, adopted, as modified by the Appellate Body 
Report, WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R, DSR 1999:I, 44.  Available at 
http://www.wto.org/English/traptop_e/dispu_e/repertory_e/d1_e.htm 
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MFN and NT principle as well as the prohibition of quantitative restrictions may be 
implied should parties to the Kyoto Protocol, for example discriminate between AAUs, 
CERs or ERUs based on country of origin. 
 
The GATT also does not define exactly what constitutes goods or products.   
Guidance to what members understand to be products can be taken from the “schedules 
of concessions”.55  This suggests that products are seen as tangible goods.  Further, 
GATT practice indicates that WTO members are likely to take a case-by-case approach 
to the question of whether a particular item is products or goods.  Panel decisions do not 
create precedents to which future panels are binded, it does however provide us with a 
direction of trends followed.   
 
Petsonk,56 argues that although ERUs and CERs are created by the Kyoto Protocol and 
have a market value, they are intangible goods.  The author then continues arguing that 
ERUs and CERs are specifically created by governments to meet their Kyoto Protocol 
commitments and are produced only through Kyoto Protocols flexible mechanism and 
function more as “transactable components of sovereign obligations”.  The author then 
refers to AAUs and state that they exist only in consequence of, and through, the legally 
binding commitments of sovereign nations to limit GHG emissions and resemble goods 
or products even less.57   
 
The author continues to argue that there is a distinction between goods and “transactable 
components of sovereign obligations” supported by GATT practice.  This she supports by 
referring to the unadopted 1985 GATT Panel Report on “Canada - Measures Affecting 
the Sale of Gold Coins”,58 (Gold Coin case).  This dispute involved gold coins of South 
Africa (Krugerand) and Canada (Maple Leaf).  The panel found that when these gold 
                                                 
55 All WTO members have a schedule of concessions (which usually consist of maximum tariff levels for 
trade in goods) which is either annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol to the GATT 1994 or to a Protocol of 
Accession.  See http://www.wto.org/English/traptop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm  
56 Petsonk, A., “The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO:  Integrating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowance 
Trading into the Global Marketplace”, Duke Environmental Law and Policy, Fall 1999, p 185. 
57 Ibid, p.199. 
58Canada – Measures Affecting the Sale of Gold Coins, GATT Panel Report, Sept. 17, 1985, unadopted, 
L/5863 p. 51.  Available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91160064.pdf  
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coins were traded as “investment goods” they would be deemed “like products”, and 
subject to the GATT.  The panel also noted that should these coins be utilized as “legal 
tender”, they are a means of payment and not covered by GATT.  Petsonk then concludes 
and translates it into Kyoto language, that to the extent that AAUs, ERUs and CERs are a 
form of “legal tender” or “means of payment” in satisfaction of a Kyoto Protocol 
obligation, they would not be considered “products” or “goods”.  Should they be treated 
as “investment goods”, the WTO rules would apply.  This will imply that when a party to 
the Kyoto Protocol which is also a member of the WTO seek restitution via the WTO, the 
unadopted Gold Coin case may be invoked. 
 
Weiser,59 argues that the perception of goods being tangible has become more elastic 
referring to the European Court of Justice that ruled that electricity is a “good”.  The 
author then redefines the concept of goods as being “something produced by labour, 
intellectual effort or natural process that can be transported from place to place and that 
possesses physical attributes”.60  AAUs, ERUs and CERs may be paper certificates or 
only exist in electronic form and to this extend they may be things in a sense that a 
printed licence is a thing, but the holder of the certificate values this certificate or license 
for the rights it conveys.  The author then defines a “permission” as a licence granted by 
the COP to the holder, to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent.  Thus, permission 
by an authority to act in a certain way.  While this “permission” is transferable, the 
“permission” itself has no physical attributes and is not produced by a production 
process.  He then concludes that the credits or units created by the Kyoto Protocol, are a 
license that confers a right, a future right to pollute and that a licence is not a good and 
would therefore probably not fall under GATT coverage.61 
 
Wemaere and Streck,62  argue that the phrase “emissions trading” is not entirely correct 
because emissions are not traded, emission rights are.  The learned authors define an 
                                                 
59 Weiser, G., “Frontiers in trade:  the clean development mechanism and the general agreement on trade in 
service”, International Journal of Global Environmental Issues, Vol. 2. Nos3/4, 2002. 
60 Ibid, p. 294. 
61 Ibid, p. 295. 
62 Freestone D. (ed.) and Streck C. (ed.), “Legal Aspects of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms:  
Making Kyoto Work”, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 47. 
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emission right as the right to emit a certain quantity of a specified substance during a 
defined period of time.  The authors conclude that emission allowances or emission rights 
are at core “certificates” whatever their legal nature and the GATT do not cover the 
category of certificates.  Therefore it will not be seen as goods or products.63 
 
Werksman,64 argues that because emissions allowances will be traded internationally and 
will have a market value, emissions allowances can be characterized as “commodities”. 
The author also states that the extension of the scope of domestic and financial markets 
incorporates now more “non-tangible” financial instruments, but he then continues 
arguing that there is no evidence that WTO members have an understanding of what a 
product is or that the WTO will even expand the definition of product.65  
 
Claims under the GATS will most likely arise on allegations that the CDM projects and 
resulting CERs create services that are tradable.  The potential coverage of GATS is 
broad and extends to services in all sectors but excludes services supplied in the exercise 
of governmental authority.  The GATS also does not define what a service is and here 
guidance can be taken from the commitments and exemptions members have negotiated 
in each country’s schedule of commitments.  The obligation each member has undertaken 
is set out in its own schedule.66   
 
The MFN and NT principles are fundamental to the GATS as it is to the GATT, but it is 
applied differently.  Referring to the MFN principle as set out in Article II of GATS, 
WTO members had a once-off opportunity to exempt from the coverage of GATS certain 
measures that provided more favourable treatment to identified countries.  The 
exemptions were granted for up to ten years from the time the GATS agreement entered 
into force.  The exemptions appear as part of the Annex to article II of GATS.  With 
regard to the NT as set out in Article XVII and market access as set out in XVI of GATS, 
                                                 
63 Ibid, p.47. 
64 Supra note 53. 
65 Supra note 50, p. 166. 
66 These schedules of commitments are set out in the National Schedules to the GATS.  There is a National 
Schedule for each WTO member.  See “An Introduction to the GATS”, WTO Secretariate, Oct. 1999. 
Available at http://www.wto.org/english/traptop_e/serv_e/cbt_course_e/signin_e.htm  
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WTO members can exempt certain services or service sectors from its application.  
Countries have identified certain service sectors, in a schedule of commitments to the 
GATS, to be subjected to WTO rules.  Thus quantitative restrictions on market access 
and discriminatory conditions may prevail over certain services not subjected to WTO 
disciplines.67  On this point, it is interesting to note that one of the most relevant sectors 
for the Kyoto Protocol is the energy service sector and very few WTO members have 
made commitments on energy related services.     
 
The Kyoto Protocol specifies that the CDMs purpose is to assist non Annexure I parties 
in achieving sustainable development, but it does not provide common guidelines for 
sustainable development criteria.  The COP has not yet been able to adopt an 
international rule for sustainable development criteria relating to CDM projects.  It is thus 
up to the each country to determine their own criteria and assessment process for 
sustainable development.  Annex I parties might therefore discriminate and prefer not to 
accept CERs originating form non-Annexure I host countries, not fitting their criteria of 
national sustainable development rules.  Should CERs be classified as services, this 
situation may implicate a violation of the MFN principle and a claim may be directed to 
the WTO.  This example is also applicable should credits be regarded as goods. 
     
Perhaps one of the only precedents for the international trade in government issued 
environmental permits is the provisions of The US Clean Air Act.68  Under the US Clean 
Air Act emissions trading scheme, a power plant is given a cap that is equal to a certain 
amount of emissions allowances.  Should the plant reduced its emissions below its cap, 
the excess allowances can be sold to other plants which can in return raise its emissions 
targets to that extent.  The Clean Air Act defines that the term “allowance” means “an 
authorization, allocated to an affected unit by the Administrator under this subchapter, to 
emit, during or after a specified calendar year, one ton of sulphur dioxide”.69  Based on 
                                                 
67 WTO Secretariate, Trade in Services, Oct. 1999. 
68 Clean Air Act, Subchapter IV-A (1996) Acid Deposition Control, 42 U.S.C.A §§ 7651 to 
7651o, West.  See also J. Werksman, p 168, supra note 55.  Available at http://www.law.cornell. 
Edu/uscode/html/uscode42/html/usc_sec_42_00007651---a000.html 
69Ibid. 
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this, Weiser concludes that allowances are government issued limited authorizations, thus 
licences, that allows a holder to emit a specified amount of pollution.70    
 
Weiser further argues that The US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) is 
authorized to regulate trade in emission allowances.  Parties trading in these allowances 
must demonstrate to the US Environmental Protection Agency that these allowances 
represent a reduction below required levels and have to obtain government approval to 
trade these allowances. The same follows for CERs.   Once a project is identified, it is 
submitted to government for endorsement and then for validation, registration and 
verification by the CDM Executive Board.  Based on certification reports submitted (a 
written assurance that a project activity achieved the GHG emissions reduction as 
verified) the Executive Board will issue CERs.  Both of these emissions allowances are 
created by an administrative institution under governmental authority and will not be part 
of the project or of the services that created the project.  Weiser then concludes that 
emissions allowances are rather a tradable permit that gives the permit holder the right to 
emit a specified amount of emissions.71 
 
Werksman is of the opinion that internationally traded emissions allowances have  
financial value and could therefore be considered a “negotiable instrument” within the 
meaning of GATS.  Article 5(x) states: 
 
  “Trading for own account or for account of customers, whether on an exchange, in an  over-the-
counter market or otherwise….. derivative products including, but not limited to, futures and 
options….. transferable securities…..other negotiable instruments and financial assets…”.72   
 
 
Werksman uses the analogy of trade in currency and argues that although currency is not 
itself a service, good or product, but the sovereign provision of financial service and 
currency exchange are regulated by the GATS.  Translated this implies that, depending 
on a country’s specific commitments, a country may be required to guarantee market 
access for units and credits of parties to the Kyoto Protocol.  A country would not, 
                                                 
70 Supra note 59 , p 296. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Supra note 47, Annex on Financial Services, article 5 (x). 
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however under GATS rules be required to recognize the allowances, units or credits of 
another party to the Kyoto Protocol for use within its domestic market.73   Thus even if 
GATS applies, which requires that brokers and other financial service providers within a 
country be free to buy and sell the emissions allowances issued by any other WTO 
member, a country could none the less, refuse to recognize these allowances as valid for 
the purpose of offsetting emissions within its territory.  
 
Petsonk also compares emissions trading to sovereign obligations such as currencies or 
debt, but concludes that neither currency nor debt are created as a consequence of a 
multilateral treaty obligation and that both arise as a consequence of domestic obligations 
Therefore it differs from emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol. 74 
4.3  Subsidies  
As described, the Kyoto Protocol envisions emissions trading parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol, but the final result will probably see countries allocating their rights among 
their domestic industries, and letting them do much of the international trade themselves.  
Thus, how will countries make the initial allocation of emission rights and will the initial 
domestic allocation of allowances be an actionable subsidy and in violation of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures?  Will the allocation of allowances 
per se constitute an actionable subsidy?  If we regard the distribution of such rights as a 
financial contribution from government to industry, then that contribution may be 
considered as a subsidy under the Subsidies Agreement.75  It could be argued that due to 
the implementation of obligations committed to under the Kyoto Protocol certain issues 
will be relative in regard to the allocation of emissions allowances if it can be deemed a 
subsidy if there is a failure to enforce domestic measures or if payments under the CDM 
constitute a subsidy?  The latter two issues will not be discussed as it falls outside the 
scope of this research.   Article 1 of the Subsidies Agreement defines a subsidy as 
follows: 
                                                 
73 Supra note 55, p. 167. 
74 Supra note 64, p 200. 
75Supra note 48. 
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  “For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if:     
  (a)(1)  there is a financial contribution by the government or any public body within   the     
territory of the member in this discussion referred to as “Government” where: 
  (i)       a government practice involves direct transfer of funds (eg. grants, loans, and equity 
infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (eg. loan, guarantees).  
  (b)     a benefit is thereby conferred”.76  
Further, Article 1(2), read together with Article 2, the agreement provides only for 
“specific subsidies” which in general are available only to an enterprise, industry or 
group of enterprises or group of industries within the jurisdiction of the authority granting 
the subsidy.77 
 Three categories of subsidies are identified in the Subsidies Agreement.  
Article 3 “Prohibited” subsidies: Irrespective of what argument, conditions, or cause a 
selective discrimination of domestic over imported goods.78  Prohibited subsidies are 
subject to dispute settlement by the Dispute Settlement Body.  
Article 5 “Actionable” subsidies:  Subsidies should have no adverse effects to the interest 
of other member states, nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or 
indirectly to the other signatories under the general agreement (with special reference to 
benefits of bound tariff concessions), or serious prejudice to the interests of other 
members.79  “Serious prejudice” is formulated as presumed to exist for certain subsidies 
such as where the total “ad valorem” subsidy of a product exceeds 5 per cent.80  Members 
affected by this kind of subsidy, can refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement Body. 
Article 8 “Non actionable” subsidies:  Subsidies can be non-specific subsidies or specific 
in nature. It involves assistance in industrial research, pre-competitive development 
activity, assistance to disadvantaged regions or certain types of assistance to adapt 
existing facilities to the new environmental requirement imposed by laws or 
                                                 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Article 5, Ibid. 
80 Article 6.1 (a), Ibid. 
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regulations.81  Should a member be of the opinion that this kind of subsidy is the cause of 
serious adverse effects to its domestic industry, determination and recommendation may 
be sought. 
A country’s decision to restrict the emission of GHGs within its borders, is a country's 
sovereign right.  It is also a country’s sovereign right to determine how much each 
enterprise or economic sector may emit and whether these emission rights are 
transferable.  The Kyoto Protocol does not prescribe how nations are to allocate their 
assigned amounts.  Hence, an Annex I party can allocate AA by means of AAUs, as it 
wishes.  Countries will base their allocation on auctioning,82 grandfathering,83 social or 
economic or political rationales, or earlier action undertaken by industries to reduce 
emissions.84 
Irrespective of which approach has been chosen, some groups will have more advantage 
than others. By definition it will always be so when the government allocates scarce 
natural resources.  The question is if the allocation of allowances constitutes a “financial 
contribution” or if the transactability thereof is defined as a “financial contribution” in 
terms of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies. 
Each party to the Kyoto Protocol has negotiated legally binding commitments.  Thus, the 
allocation of AA is in effect the distribution of an Annex I party’s responsibility to 
comply with the Kyoto Protocol obligations as an international regulatory regime. 
Petsonk argues:  
  “Identifying Kyoto Protocol allocations as subsidies could be tantamount to saying that any 
allocation of any responsibility for regulation—whether domestic or international would 
constitute a subsidy.  By that reasoning, any country’s sovereign decision to subject some and 
not all sources of pollution to a regulatory system would constitute a subsidy, and the entire 
                                                 
81 Supra note 64, p. 204. 
82 Any amount of the allocated allowances may be auctioned during the period of 2008-2012. 
83 Allocation based on historic emissions levels. 
84This type of approach (with many variants) a nation or a group makes a commitment and agrees on the 
formula for allocation, based on the history of the emissions performance prior to the commitment period 
allocation.  Supra note 63, p. 206 and 207. 
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national and international framework of environmental regulation would be subject to subsidies 
challenge”.85   
Therefore regarding the allocation of allowances as a subsidy will not resort under the 
Subsidies Agreement of the WTO.   It will thus not be regarded as a prohibited or 
actionable or even a non actionable subsidy. 
4.4 Conclusion and Recommendations 
It will be costly for parties to the Kyoto Protocol to comply with their obligations under 
the Kyoto Protocol in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  According to economic 
analysis the most cost efficient way to reduce GHGs emissions is to apply free trade 
principles as this also presents the best option to reduce GHGs on global scale. Therefore, 
the need for a framework which incorporates the principles of non discrimination and 
transparency exists.  It would be favorable to incorporate emissions trading into the WTO 
body of rules coupled with the fact that the WTO is being pressured to address 
environmental issues.  Within the body of rules of the WTO there is currently no 
framework for the classification of emissions allowances created by the Kyoto Protocol 
to rely on or give guidance. 
It seems that there is consensus among most academic scholars that emission allowances 
will not be characterized as goods or products. Government to government trading of 
assigned amounts does not create a market in goods, rather it corresponds to a sovereign 
to sovereign exchange of commitments.  The sovereign exchange of assigned amounts 
could be viewed as the reallocation of the overall assigned amounts established by the 
Kyoto Protocol rather than the creation of a market.  Goods or products are traditionally 
also seen as being more tangible.  In this case, there is no interaction with WTO rules.   
Petsonk continues to argue, that should the Gold Coin case be invoked, it opens the 
possibility that emissions allowances might be defined as investment goods. 
As for GATS, Werksman argues that emissions allowances might be defined as 
“negotiable instruments” and compares it to currency but Petsonk argues that emissions 
                                                 
85 Supra note 64, p. 207. 
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allowances are not analogues to currency or debt.  Lastly, Weiser argues that emission 
allowances are tradable permits or licenses.  The application of GATS is not ruled out.  
GATS might be applicable in that the parties can identify which sector, sub sectors or 
activities they will list in their schedules of commitments, these schedules can be 
modified, but only under certain circumstances and provisions.  There are currently no 
services listed that are analogues to the issuance of ERUs or CERs or place emission 
allowances under the ambit of GATS.  GATS allow for WTO members to reclassify 
definitions of specific services from time to time.  The possibility thus exists that these 
lists can include services analogous to the issuance of Kyoto Protocol units or credits in 
the future.86  Further, many of the GATS disciplines are also in a formative stage and 
have yet to be tested in a dispute.   
Should allowances be characterized as goods or services, it may prima facie be seen as a 
violation of WTO law concerning the non discrimination principle encapsulated in the 
MFN and NT principle.  For example: 
The MFN principle can be implicated if a non-Annex I country choose to accept a CDM 
project by an Annex I country, based on the project sponsors country of origin or give 
preferential treatment to that country’s service providers;   
Breach of  NT principle can be claimed if a non-Annex I country adopt different project 
rules and standards for domestic and non-domestic project developers or where a non-
Annex I country give preferential treatment to its domestic service providers. 
Measures like these would thus be seen as arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where like conditions prevail.   
 
The WTO rules allows further for exceptions to these principles as provide for in GATT 
article XX or GATS article XIV’s general exceptions provisions.  There exists the 
possibility that provisions of the Kyoto Protocol might be covered by these exceptions 
lessening potential conflict between the two regimes.  These provisions allow countries to 
adopt or enforce trade measures that are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life 
                                                 
86 See http://docs.google.com/Doc?id=w.dc4wk75_g6bggd   
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or health”,87 or that relate “to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption”.88  However, this calls for a discussion on its own merits. 
Initial allocation of emissions allowances will probably not be seen as a specific subsidy 
and therefore not qualify as actionable and subject to countervailing measures of other 
WTO members.  The allocation of emissions allowances can neither be regarded as 
financial contributions nor as an income or price support.  Allocation of allowances to 
private entities does not confer a benefit according to article I of the Subsidies Agreement 
because it is accompanied by an obligation to reduce GHGs to a certain level. 
For the short term a license principle approach should be implemented until a framework 
has been created in the WTO for the classification of emission allowances and the trading 
there of.  Referring to the US Clean Air Act, both CERs and SO2’s are a government 
granted permission as discussed.  Thus by clearly defining CERs (as well as “emissions 
reduction units” under Article 6, joint implementation and “assigned amount units” under 
Article 17, emissions trading) as a form of license or permit, Kyoto Protocol Parties could 
lessen the possibility of potential conflict with WTO rules or an attempt to use the WTO 
dispute settlement understanding to preempt or to redefine COP intentions.  Parties might 
include language in the CDM implementing decision that paraphrases the U.S. Clean Air 
Act language: “CERs shall constitute a limited authorization to emit carbon dioxide 
equivalent in accordance with the rules in and under the Protocol”.89  Also, to view CERs 
as licenses the COP/MOP would have no sole authority to decide the following: whether 
CER trade with non Parties would be restricted, whether CDM eligibility criteria could 
curtail a Party’s ability to use CERs or whether the COP or a designated authority might 
respond to a case of non-compliance by suspending the right of a Party to export, import 
or redeem CERs.  In addition, the license view could protect the right of individual 
parties to enact domestic regulations that restrict the use of CERs in ways not specifically 
                                                 
87 GATT Article XX (b), supra note 42 and GATS Article XIV (b), supra note 43. 
88 GATT Article XX (g), supra note 42. 
89 Supra note.  
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articulated under the international rules. This might eliminate the uncertainty for policy 
makers as to whether their decisions could run foul with the WTO.90 
The dialogue between the US and the EC illustrates existing and potential disagreements 
between the WTO and the Kyoto Protocol, and it shows the need for the WTO to 
effectively apply itself to conflicts that relate to trade and the environment.  
To date, however, neither the UNFCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol has set up committees to 
examine possible conflicts with the WTO.  They anticipate studying the issues of 
substantive and institutional compatibility only once the first round of the Kyoto Protocol 
projects is sufficiently in progress.  Because climate change institutions have not 
immediately addressed the issue and that there is currently an absence of a suitable 
centralized environmental dispute settlement forum coupled by the fact that it might be 
favourable to incorporate emissions trading into the WTO body of rules, are all 
arguments that the WTO, by default, has become the most probable forum to define how 
questions are framed and in the long term, how they are resolved.91   
 
Thus, for a WTO member country that is also a party to the Kyoto Protocol, the biggest 
challenge is to pursue both the Uruguay Round and the Kyoto Protocol objectives in the 
short term and in the long term.  Policy makers and can do this by enhancing the synergy 
among policies and by avoiding any conflict that might arise from unilateral 
discriminatory trade measures. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
90 Supra note 59, p 296. 
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